Philanthropy, and particularly ensuring that ones giving is e↵ective, can require substantial time and e↵ort. One way to reduce these costs, and thus encourage greater giving, could be to encourage delegation of giving decisions to better-informed others. At the same time, because it involves a loss of agency, delegating these decisions may produce less warm-glow and thus reduce one's charitable impulse. Unfortunately, the importance of agency in charitable decisions remains largely unexplored. In this paper, using a laboratory experiment with real donations, we shed light on this issue. Our main finding is that agency, while it does correlate with self-reported warm-glow, nevertheless seems to play a small role in encouraging giving. In particular, people do not reduce donations when giving decisions are made by (costly) algorithms that guarantee e cient recipients. Moreover, we find participating in giving groups a weaker form of delegation is also e↵ective in that they are appealing to donors who would not otherwise make informed donations, and thus improves overall e↵ective giving. Our results suggest that one path to promoting e↵ective giving may be to create institutions that facilitate delegated generosity. JEL-Classification: C9, D64, D71
Introduction
More than 1.5 million non-profits are registered in the US (NCCS, 2014). As a result, donors may find it challenging to select the charities whose programs have the greatest impact on the well-being of the participants. One solution is to directly acquire information before giving. However, this requires time and resources that donors may not have or may not be willing to invest (Yildirim and Krasteva 2014; Niehaus 2015) . Another solution is to delegate this task to a specialized intermediary that vets di↵erent charitable projects and selects those with the highest promise or evidence of impact.
Intermediaries such as foundations, giving clubs, community funds and, more recently, donor-advised funds, are becoming central players in the giving market. 1 Traditionally associated with high capacity donors, these intermediaries are working to expand their services to a broader base of donors. Despite this excitement, little is known about the role agency plays in charitable decisions. Delegating giving involves a loss of control over the final recipient of a donation, which may reduce the charitable impulse if donors experience less satisfaction or warm glow (Andreoni 1989 (Andreoni ,1990 ) from donations made by a third party. The decision to delegate thus involves a tradeo↵: on the one hand, intermediaries reduce the relative cost of making informed, e↵ective donations, which may attract donors who care about e↵ective giving but have limited resources to acquire relevant information. On the other hand, donations made by better-informed agents may be unappealing to donors who derive non-monetary utility from retaining authority.
This paper is a first step toward understanding the economics of agency in the context of giving decisions. Using a "field in the lab" experiment, we vary across treatments whether donors can directly make real donations; delegate the choice of the recipient to an intermediary; or choose between direct and delegated donations. Donors can choose to costly acquire real information about charities' qualities before making direct donations, and we vary the characteristics of the intermediary institutions along two dimensions: the cost of information and the level of agency. Finally, all participants complete a survey to elicit the importance they place on impact giving and warm glow. Real intermediaries in fact di↵er in the amount of agency and e↵ort they require from donors. Foundations and community funds typically accept only unrestricted gifts to the general cause they support. As such, donors have no control over final recipients, but bear no costs related to information acquisition. At the opposite end of the spectrum, giving clubs allow donors to make collective giving decisions. Thus, donors retain some control over their decisions, but also face some costs if they want to make informed donations (e.g., attending meetings, providing suggestions etc.).
Our data provide the first direct evidence of the distribution of (and relationship between) preferences for e↵ective giving and agency, and show how these preferences a↵ect 1 Gifts from (non-corporate) foundations alone accounted for 15% of total US charitable contributions in 2014 (Source: Giving USA). Donor advised funds are experiencing double digit growth, with total assets held in 2014 of $ 70.7 billion (Source: National Philanthropic Trust).
the performances of di↵erent intermediaries. 2 Consistent with previous studies (Fong and Oberholzer-Gee 2011), we find that only one-third of donors pay to make informed donations when intermediaries are not available, and we find no evidence of a strong aversion to delegation in the population. On the extensive margins however, di↵erent donors select into di↵erent intermediaries. Foundation-like intermediaries only attract donors who already place high value on e↵ective giving, but fail overall to generate more informed giving. Conversely, club-like intermediaries attract donors who would not have otherwise made informed donations, but are unappealing to donors with high willingness to pay for information.
Experimental design
Our experiment consisted of five treatments. In all treatments, participants were endowed with E$40 (US$20) (plus $5 show up fee), and chose how to split their endowment between themselves and a real charity chosen from a large database of US charities. 3 All participants completed a post-experiment survey about their attitudes toward giving.
In T1, our first baseline treatment, donors could only give by directly choosing a recipient. The user-friendly interface provided detailed information about all charities' missions and characteristics (e.g., type of cause, scope of activity, stated mission). 4 The database also contained ratings and statistics about charities' financial health, accountability, and transparency. 5 This information about charities' qualities was hidden at the beginning of the experiment, but donors could choose to pay E$2 to reveal these ratings and statistics for (up to) 20 charities of their choice. 6 After subjects selected a charity, they chose how much to donate.
In T2, our second baseline treatment, donors could only give through an algorithm. Subjects faced the same user-friendly interface of T1, but could not directly select a recipient. To make a donation, they indicated: (i) a general cause they want to support (e.g., Health); (ii) a sub-cause (e.g., Medical research); and (iii) the scope of the activity (e.g., International, national, or regional charity 7 ) ). The algorithm then selected the charity that, within these three criteria, scored highest in terms of financial health, accountability, and transparency. After seeing the charity chosen by the algorithm (and its qualities), donors chose how much to give. Giving through the algorithm had no cost. In all treatments, donors could choose not to donate at the beginning of the experiment, in which case the experiment ended immediately. 4 See instructions in Appendix A for screenshots of the interface.
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These metrics come from Charity Navigator 2.0 (www.charitynavigator.org).
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The decision can be repeated. Each block of 20 charities costs E$2.
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If they chose regional, they could select the specific US state.
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Note that after the three criteria were chosen, donors could only give to the charity chosen by the algorithm. They could, however, donate zero, if they wanted to.
In T3, our third and last baseline, donors could only give by "joining a club." Subjects faced the same user-friendly interface of T1, but could not directly select a recipient. If they wanted to make a donation, they were required to join the experimental session's club. Once in the club, donors could choose to pay to reveal the qualities of up to 20 charities at a reduced cost of E$1. Once every club member had chosen whether to reveal information, all charities whose qualities had been revealed by club members were shown to all members. Each member then chose whether to cast a vote for one charity in the pool at a cost of E$1. Votes determined which charity (or charities, up to 3 depending on votes) would receive donations from the club. After the vote, the winning charities were shown to all members, who then individually (and privately) chose how much to donate. 9 Our treatment T4 allowed donors to choose between making a direct donation and giving through the algorithm. After this decision, the experiment proceeded as previously described. Finally, our treatment T5 allowed donors to choose between making a direct donation and giving through the club. As in T4, after this decision, the experiment proceeded as described. At the end of each treatment, participants completed a survey eliciting the importance they place on impact giving, information, and warm glow giving. 10 We had a total of 285 subjects. The experiment was run at George Mason University, and was programmed using JavaScript.
Hypotheses
Our treatments varied the cost of making informed donations and the level of agency. Informed direct donations cost E$2 and provided maximum agency. Informed algorithm donations cost E$0 and provided minimum agency. Informed club donations could cost E$0, E$1, or E$2, depending on whether donors voted and/or paid for information, and provided intermediate agency. This variation allowed us to cast the following hypotheses.
H1: If there is a strong aversion to delegation in the population, fewer subjects will make positive donations in T2 and T3 compared to T1, and average donations will be lower.
In T2 and T3 donors can only make delegated donations, thus strong aversion to delegation predicts less frequent and smaller donations.
H2:
The algorithm mechanism attracts donors who place a low value on agency and a positive value on informed giving.
Donors who place high value on agency will always prefer making direct donations (either informed or uninformed depending on their value for informed giving) over algorithm donations. When the value for agency is low instead, donors who value informed giving If more than one charity received votes, the charities with more votes (up to 3) received club donations, each receiving a donation corresponding to the share of votes received. Donors could donate zero, if they wanted to. at more than E$2 delegate to the algorithm, as the latter provides for free information they would have bought anyway. Donors who value informed giving at less than E$2 will delegate to the algorithm only if the benefit from an informed donation are greater than the (low) cost of delegating.
H3: The club mechanism attracts donors who value informed giving at less than E$2, both with high and low value of agency.
Donors who value informed giving at more than E$2 will prefer direct (informed) over club donations, while those who value information at E$2 will be indi↵erent: this is because for these donors, the cost of acquiring information that is instrumental to an e↵ective donation is the same for clubs (E$1 + E$1) and direct donations (E$2). Donors who value information above E$1 but below E$2 and place high value on agency may delegate to the club, as E$1 allows them to cast a vote and therefore maintain (some) agency over decisions. Donors who place high value on agency but value information at less than E$1 will not delegate but make direct (uninformed) donations. Finally, donors who place low value on agency and value information at more than E$0 but less than E$2 will delegate to the club. These results are important, as they show that donors do not display a strong aversion to delegation per se. To explore further the relative importance of e↵ective giving and control, we turn to treatments where delegation is optional (T4 and T5).
Results

R2:
The algorithm attracts only donors who value information at more than E$2.
In our baseline treatment T1, 30% of donors chose to acquire information about charities' quality at a cost of E$2. Informed donors donated on average E$ 9.6, while uninformed donors gave an average of E$6.9 (z=2.22; p=0.025). Thus, about one-third of T1 donors valued informed giving at more than E$2. This represents our baseline demand for information. Informed donors gave to better rated charities than those chosen by uninformed donors (z=-1.75;0.079).
When participants had the option to delegate to the algorithm (T4), 30.2% chose to do so, and the fraction of informed donors donating directly dropped to 6.9%. Overall however, the number of informed donors in baseline T1 (30%) and T4 (37%) remained statistically indistinguishable (z=0.82;p=0.40). These results suggest that the algorithm mechanism only attracts donors who place a high value on e↵ective giving (e.g. above E$2), and that only a minority of such donors also place high value on agency (6.9%). Thus, overall, the algorithm mechanism fails to attract donors who value information at less than E$2. A plausible explanation is that the algorithm involves a relatively high agency cost.
R3: The club doubles the percentage of informed donors by attracting donors who value information at less or equal than E$2
When the delegating alternative is the club, we find two main results. First, the fraction of direct donors who paid to become informed remained unchanged compared to baseline T1 (30% in T1, and 30.7% in T5; z=0.06; p=0.94 12 ). Second, 50.9% of donors chose to make informed donations by giving through the club, raising the total percentage of informed donors from 30% in T1 to 66% in T5 (z=3.42;p=0.000). As hypothesized, the
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Nor from treatments in which donors have the option to delegate, T4 (40.3%; z=0.81;p=0.41) and T5 (32.1%; z=-0.15;p=0.87).
12
Informed direct donors in T5 represent the 15.1% of the entire pool of donors (including club donors).
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club was unappealing to donors valuing information at more than E$2, while attracting donors with lower valuation of information. Looking at voting and information purchase decisions, we find that 15% of club donors did not pay for information or pay to vote; 8% paid for information but did not vote; 33% did not purchase information but voted; and 44% both paid for information and voted. Thus, overall, 56% of club donors valued information at less than E$1, while 44% of donors were willing to pay E$2 to participate in the club despite the fact that they likely would not have purchased information at E$2 for a direct donation. Figure 1 summarizes donors' selection into di↵erent giving mechanisms. Our next results provide a possible explanation for why clubs induce high overall participation and willingness to pay for informed giving. R4: In our one-shot setting, the presence of intermediaries does not increase average giving, but increases the allocation e ciency of gifts Average positive giving in our baseline treatment T1 was E$7.75, which is not statistically significantly di↵erent from average donations made in T4 (both direct and algorithm donations, E$10.62; z=-1.1;p=0.268) and in T5 (both direct and club donations, E$7.98; z=0.19, p=0.844). While giving was similar, the quality of charities was not. Donors who gave through the algorithm donated to charities with higher accountability, transparency, and financial health ratings, both compared to T4 direct donors (z=2.7;p=0.006) and T1 direct donors (z=2.3;p=0.02). Further, the presence of the algorithm mechanism reduced the per capita cost of becoming informed by 76% compared to the baseline T1 (z=-2.75;p=0.005). Also, clubs had positive e↵ects on the quality of charities: the average quality of club donations was not statistically di↵erent from direct donations. However, clubs selected only a few charities, making the average quality very sensitive to outliers. If we exclude charities that scored 0 or 1 on quality (2 out of the total 19 club charities; 4 out total 96 directly selected charities, both informed and uninformed), then clubs indeed gave to better charities than individuals (z=-2.01; p=0.045).
R5: Club donors and uninformed direct donors value warm glow significantly more than algorithm donors and informed direct donors
In a post-experiment survey, participants were asked whether they generally respond more to solicitations that appeal to their heart or that highlight the impact and e cacy of the charity (see Appendix A). This can be considered as a proxy for the importance of warm glow giving (see Karlan and Wood 2014; List, Murphy and Price 2015). Unsurprisingly, we find that uninformed donors reported placing a higher value on warm glow than their informed counterparts (z=1.79; p=0.072). However, only direct informed donors and algorithm donors drove this di↵erence: while algorithm donors and direct informed donors displayed lower preferences for warm glow than uninformed donors (z=2.21;p=0.027), club donors displayed warm glow preferences similar to their uninformed counterparts. A probit model (not reported here, standard errors clustered at the session level) shows similar results: conditional on giving, a 20% increase in reported preferences for warm glow corresponds to a 50.9% decrease in the probability of delegating to the algorithm (p=0.021), but has no e↵ect on the probability of delegating to the club (p=0.313). Finally, a two-sided jonkeree-Terprsa test reveals that as self-reported warm glow preferences increase, average donations decrease (J*=-2.44;p=0.014). These results suggest that the popularity of the club mechanism might be linked to the club's ability to preserve warm glow, either due to the possibility of giving to multiple charities (see Karlan and Wood 2015) , or to the collective nature of decisions.
Conclusions
The charitable intermediary sector is growing rapidly. A vibrant intermediary sector, while certainly not immune from challenges 13 , may benefit the giving market. Potential benefits include more e↵ective and coordinated allocation of gifts; more regular giving; more competition in a sector currently dominated by a few large intermediaries (Andreoni and Payne 2013); and, as a result, stronger support to social causes for which these intermediaries provide little or no support.
We provide preliminary but important evidence on the interplay between donors' preferences for e↵ective giving and agency, as well as suggestive evidence on the role of warm glow in delegation decisions. Although only a minority of donors (one-third) is willing to pay to make informed donations, we do not find a strong aversion to delegating giving to better-informed parties, when this is the only option. This might explain why fundraising campaigns that solicit donations to pre-vetted charities, such as those run by large firms, are relatively successful. On the extensive margins however, we find that di↵erent intermediaries attract di↵erent donors. Foundation-like intermediaries attract donors who place high value on e↵ective giving, but are less attractive to donors less concerned by e↵ective giving and more concerned by warm glow. Club-like intermediaries have the opposite e↵ect: donors with high preferences for e↵ective giving do not join our experimental clubs, but donors who would not make the e↵ort to become informed on their own do. As such, the presence of clubs more than doubles the fraction of donors who make informed donations.
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